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Litigation against tobacco companies, about smoking-related diseases,
is novel outside of the United States. While in the past two decades U.S.
courts have handed down costly verdicts against tobacco companies,
European courts have not been as willing to rule against the tobacco
industry. 1  European courts have been much more reluctant to award
damages to individuals with smoking related diseases or their families.2 As
a result, courts outside the United States have not handed down major
decisions against tobacco companies.
This comment will examine the few "successful" tobacco litigation
cases that have been brought outside of the United States (focusing on the
United Kingdom) and compare them to recent litigation in U.S. courts in an
effort to analyze why U.S. litigants faired better than their British
counterparts. This comment compares the legal structures in the United
States and the United Kingdom, analyzing the different legal theories that
plaintiffs in Europe have tried and why they ultimately failed. Questions
addressed include: a) does the failure of these claims reflect inherent
differences in the United Kingdom's legal system that make winning
* Andrei Sirabionian, B.A. UCLA, J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of
Law.
1 Richard A. Daynard, Tobacco Litigation: A Mid Course Review, Tobacco Products
Liability Project: Tobacco Control Resource Center, Northeastern University School of Law
383-86 (2001), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/cancer/research/tobacco/
tobacco%20notes%20archive/tobacconotes 12 383_2001.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2005).2 id.
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tobacco litigation more difficult for U.K. plaintiffs than U.S. plaintiffs, and
b) are the legal theories advanced in European cases very different from
those in the United States. If not, what other reasons could explain the
failure of tobacco claims in the United Kingdom?
This article concludes that the British tobacco cases are not flawed
from a legal perspective. Instead, the inherent difference between the legal
systems of the United States and the United Kingdom is the reason for the
ultimate failure of tobacco cases in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, this
article offers a roadmap of the direction tobacco litigation is headed in the
United Kingdom and provides sound reasoning as to why U.K. tobacco
plaintiffs will eventually enjoy the same success as their U.S. counterparts.
II. THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC TOBACCO LITIGATION
In order to better understand how far tobacco litigants have come with
their recent success, it is important to examine the history of tobacco
litigation in the United States. Also, because British litigants and attorneys
look to U.S. cases for guidance in bringing claims against tobacco
manufacturers,3 the history of tobacco litigation in the U.S. is crucial.
The idea of holding tobacco companies liable for health problems
caused by their products began in the early 1950's. 4 Legal experts believed
that any successful lawsuit against a tobacco company would open the
floodgates to litigation that would eventually overwhelm tobacco
companies.5 This belief could not have been further from the truth as the
tobacco industry compiled over 300 legal victories in the years following
the first tobacco case, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., in 1954.
Of these cases, none were settled, and in the few that made it to trial none of
7the plaintiffs ever successfully received damages. Most cases were
brought under theories of fraud, negligence and breach of warranty.
8
Cigarette companies were successful in avoiding liability of any kind by
arguing that smoking-related illnesses were unforeseeable results of
3 See, e.g., Robert Verkaik, Marlboro Man Makes a Stand - A British Smoker's Case
Against American Tobacco, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 5, 2000, available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/intl-tobacco/2000q3/000269.html.
4 Jana Schrink Strain, Medicaid v. The Tobacco Industry: A Reasonable Legislative
Solution to a State's Financial Woes?, 30 IND. L. REv. 851, 857 (1997).
5 Id. (citing Mark Curriden, The Heat is on: Facing High-Powered Plaintif's Lawyers
and Damaging Revelations, the Once Invincible Tobacco Industry may no Longer be Able to
Snuff out its Opponents, 80 A.B.A. J. 58).
61d.
7 Daynard, supra note 1, at 383.
8 Heather Cooper, Tobacco Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and
European Community Approaches to Combating the Hazards Associated with Tobacco
Products, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 275, 281 (1990).
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smoking cigarettes. 9 Further, tobacco companies argued that plaintiffs
assumed the risks of smoking. They also capitalized on the fact that they
could afford the best lawyers to defend against generally under-funded
plaintiffs. 10 As a result, the tobacco industry defended against forty years of
claims without being forced to pay anything in compensation."1 Through
1994, tobacco companies spent over $600 million in legal fees. 12
Arguably the first real blow to tobacco companies came in 1964 when
the Surgeon General issued a report entitled "Smoking and Health: Report
of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General" (Report).13 The Report
linked smoking with several deadly diseases, including lung cancer,
emphysema, and bronchitis. 14 The Report also included language stating
that smoking was a "health hazard of sufficient importance" and thus
required Congressional action.
15
In 1965, Congress, prompted by the Report, enacted the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the Act).' 6 The Act states:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse
health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices
on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of
cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to
the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B)
not impeded by diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any
relationship between smoking and health.'7
The Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1966, required cigarette
companies to include the warning "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
9 d.
'o See Strain, supra note 4, at 859.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 858.
13 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 31
(1964).
14 id.
15 Id. at 33.
16 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994)).
17 id.
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Hazardous to Your Health" on every package of cigarettes.' 8 This
language, which was amended a number of times, attempted to strike a
balance between warning the public of the adverse effects of smoking and
protecting commerce from the imposition of non-uniform cigarette
labeling. Although the Act may appear detrimental to cigarette
manufacturers at first glance, it subsequently turned out to be quite helpful
to them. After 1965, the tobacco companies could use the Act as a defense
against claims that plaintiffs were unaware of the harmful effects of
cigarette smoking.2 °
Congress amended the Act in 1970 to provide for a stronger warning
label on cigarettes stating: "Warning: The S.,,eon General Has Determined
That Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." At the same time, Congress
gave authority to various administrative agencies, including the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Federal Trade Commission, to monitor
and report on various issues such as the health consequences of smoking
and advertising policies.22
Finally, Congress passed the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
of 1984 which established an agency (the Interagency Committee on
Smoking and Health) responsible for tracing the effects of smoking and
making recommendations to Congress. 23  This Act also implemented a
system of rotating warnings to address the hazards of smoking.
Another weapon in the fight against tobacco companies was tort
theory. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965, provides for
strict liability, "making the seller subject to liability to the user or consumer
even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
18 Elizabeth C. Price, Torts - Federal Preemption of State Common Law - Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 60 TENN. L. REv. 243, 246 (1992).
19 Sven Krogius, Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: A Welcome Exercise of Restraint
in Applying Preemption Doctrine to State Tort Claims, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 209, 216 (199 1).
20 Brian H. Barr, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The Improper Assessment of Punitive Damages
for an Entire Class of Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 798 (2001).
21 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat.
88 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)).
22 Price, supra note 18, at 216-17.
23 Id. at 217.
24 Id.; Comprehensive Smoking Education Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200,
2201-02 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)). These new warnings,
which are to be rotated quarterly, are: SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking
Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy;
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risks to Your Health; SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight;
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
Id.
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the product., 25 Section 402(a) of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)
states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
26
Even after the Restatement was published in 1965, cigarette companies
could avoid strict liability under § 402(a)(1) because cigarettes were by no
means a "defective" product.2 7 A comment to the Restatement even says
"[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects
of smoking may be harmful. 28  Some experts viewed this statement as
giving per se immunity to the tobacco industry.29 Courts, in turn,
responded by throwing out many claims against cigarette companies-
making the Restatement § 402 a much less useful tool for tobacco plaintiffs
than many originally thought.3 °
A. Background: The Master Settlement Agreement, the FDA Flexes Some
Muscle
Despite all of the steps taken by the government, until recently, it was
still nearly impossible for plaintiffs to win their cases against tobacco
companies. The Labeling Act of 1964 contained a clause that worked to
preempt most of the claims being asserted against tobacco companies. 31 As
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. a (1965).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
27 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on Cigarette Litigation Under the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1998).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. i (1965).
29 Bryce A. Jensen, From Tobacco to Healthcare and Beyond: A Critique of Lawsuits
Targeting Unpopular Industries, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1340 (2001).
30 Id.
31 Strain, supra note 4, at 858; Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The "New" Wave in
Smoking and Health Litigation-Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REv. 551, 552
(1987) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-33).
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a result, the number of claims brought after the passage of the Act fell until
the late 1970's and early 1980's when theories of strict liability against
tobacco manufacturers became popular (following the publishing of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965).32 The Supreme Court also
weighed in on the issue in Cipollene v. Liggett Group, Inc. and held that the
Act did not preempt states from awarding damages based on express
warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.33
The government's war against tobacco seemed to reach an all time
high in 1994 when then Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Commissioner, Dr. David A. Kessler, announced that an investigation was
underway to determine whether tobacco products were "drugs" within the
FDA's jurisdiction.34 Kessler's announcement, coupled with televised
testimony by top tobacco executives telling Congress that they did not
believe cigarettes were addictive and the release of highly incriminating
industry documents stating that tobacco companies had long been aware of
the detrimental effects of smoking35 appeared to have tobacco companies
finally backed into a corner.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision in Food and Drug
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., held that the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which gives the Food and Drug
Administration, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
authority to regulate, among other items, "drugs" and "devices," does not
grant the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products.
3 6
32 Strain, supra note 4, at 858.
33 Cippollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
34 Daynard, supra note 1, at 383.
35 id.
36 Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
The Supreme Court held that any product regulated by the FDA must be "effective for its
intended use." The potential for death or bodily injury of any product regulated by the FDA
must be outweighed by its therapeutic effects. In its rulemaking procedures, the FDA
focused on the fact that tobacco products are unhealthy and can even cause death. Thus, if
the FDA were allowed to regulate the product, it would be required to take tobacco products
off the market. Congress, however, has explicitly foreclosed such a possibility through its
legislation which focused on the regulation of tobacco advertising and required tobacco
manufacturers to place warning labels on cigarette packets. Thus, it was clearly Congress's
intent not to have the FDA regulate tobacco (and subsequently allow for the possibility of
having it taken off the market by the FDA). The Court's reasoning, while focusing on
congressional intent, alluded to the fact that tobacco manufacturing is a big business
providing jobs for large numbers of Americans. Id. For a further discussion of this case see
generally Margaret Gilhooey, Tobacco Unregulated: Why the FDA Failed, and What to Do
Now, 111 YALE L.J. 1179 (2002); Rodney A. Morris, SSSMOKINNN': The Supreme Court
Burns the FDA 's Authority to Regulate Tobacco in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1111 (2002); Joseph G. White, Prestidigitation and the
Chevron Doctrine: Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000), 24 HAMLiNE L. REv. 285 (2001).
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The watershed point in tobacco litigation came in August of 1996,
when an individual tobacco plaintiff won $750,000 in a judgment in Tampa,
Florida.3 7 Panic hit tobacco companies and the shockwaves reached Wall
Street; the next morning tobacco stocks dropped by over ten billion dollars
as investors realized that this one verdict could actually bring about dozens
more like it.38 Tobacco companies soon shifted strategy and settled with
three states (Mississippi, Florida and Texas) in the following year.3 9
Perhaps the biggest development in recent years regarding tobacco
litigation came in 1998, when forty-six states signed a Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) with the tobacco industry. As part of the MSA,
cigarette companies agreed to stop targeting youth, stop using cartoons (e.g.
"Joe Camel") to advertise their product, and refrain from sponsoring events
such as concerts, athletic events, or any other event where a significant part
of the intended audience is "youth. 4 1 Further, tobacco manufacturers
promised to remove ads promoting cigarettes near schools and other areas
frequented by youth (e.g. malls, arcades, arenas or stadiums).4 2 Pursuant to
the MSA, participating tobacco companies agreed to pay $206 billion to• 43
forty-six states over the next twenty-six years. Four states (Florida,
Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas) settled separately with the tobacco
companies. 44 Money from the settlements was to be used for, among other
things, health and smoking prevention programs and research. .45
B. The Precursors to Engle and the Rise in Popularity of the Class Action
Lawsuit
A main factor contributing to plaintiffs' recent success against the
tobacco industry has been the onset of class action litigation.4 6 Difficulties
involved with proving causation between smoking and cancer, along with
increasing knowledge about the risk associated with smoking, have always
caused problems for plaintiffs.47 However, perhaps the greatest problem in




41 Master Settlement Agreement at 10, available at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/Extra/
multistatesettlement.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
42 Id. at 53.
43 Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery, Allocating Ohio Tobacco Settlement
Funds, Testimony before the U.S. Commerce, Science, and Transp. Comm. at 1 (Oct. 5,
2000), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/1005mon.pdf.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See generally Barr, supra note 20.
47 Strain, supra note 4, at 859.
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the fight against big tobacco has been that individual claimants lacked the
"fire-power" to take on cigarette companies on their own.48 An attempt was
made to bring together a large number of plaintiffs and put forth a suit as a
"class" in the case of Castano v. American Tobacco Co.4 9 The class action
involved a large number of plaintiffs' attorneys from top law firms, with
each firm contributing funds for the expenses of the suit (in return for hefty
fees in the case of a victory, of course). 50 However, the Castano case fell
apart because variations in the tort laws of every state involved in the suit
made it impractical and extremely difficult to try all the actions as one
claim.5 1
The move towards class-action litigation which led to the Castano case
52is sometimes referred to as the "third wave" of tobacco litigation.
Commentators have argued this "third wave" was brought about by certain
industry documents that emerged in the 1990's, most notably some of
which were "leaked" by a former Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.
48 Id.
49 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D 544, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2005 (E.D.
La. Feb. 17, 1995), rev'd 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
50 Strain, supra note 4, at 859.
51 Id.
52 Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1336, 1342 (1999). The "first wave" of litigation described above lasted from 1954
until 1965, i.e. beginning with the very first studies from the scientific community regarding
the dangers of cancer until 1965 with the adoption and publication of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. During the "first wave" of tobacco litigation cigarette companies were
very successful in arguing that they did not "foresee" injury to smokers. Thus, the chain of
causation was extremely attenuated. Further, cigarette companies used their enormous
financial resources to crush any claim by a plaintiff refusing to settle. Nevertheless, the
"first wave" set the blueprint for future claims against cigarette companies.
The "second wave" of tobacco litigation was symbolized by attempts to strengthen the
causation link between smoking and health problems. This wave included attempts by the
government to regulate tobacco by mandating that warnings be placed on cigarette packs.
The "second wave" was also characterized by the rise of mass tort litigation similar to that in
asbestos claims, where plaintiffs' attorneys were getting closer to favorable awards by
pooling resources together. Even with pooled resources, however, it was still difficult to go
up against the impressive war chests of tobacco companies who made hundreds of millions
of dollars in profits annually. Further, with government warnings and all kinds of studies
and health reports becoming more available, tobacco companies were in a good position to
argue that plaintiffs had assumed the risk of smoking themselves and knew all along (based
on cigarette warnings which now existed on every pack of cigarettes) that smoking does
indeed cause health problems. Nevertheless, after years of public knowledge that cigarettes
caused grave health problems, tobacco companies still did not pay out any compensation
because there was no internal "smoking gun" from tobacco companies stating that tobacco
executives knew of the risks associated with cigarettes and did their best to addict their
customers, thus making it impossible for them to quit should they want to. This "smoking
gun" would present itself in the "third wave" of tobacco litigation (discussed infra). For a
full discussion of the "three waves" of tobacco litigation, see generally Barr, supra note 20.
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employee, known as the "Cigarette Papers." These documents clearly
showed that cigarette company executives knew-and struggled with-the
knowledge that cigarettes can cause cancer and other diseases for several
decades. The fact that tobacco executives had this knowledge, yet
concealed it from the public and even intentionally increased levels of
nicotine in their cigarettes to addict smokers is of great strategic
importance. It is argued that this information gave rise to increasing
numbers of class action claims against cigarette manufacturers.54
The Cigarette Papers were sent anonymously to a University of
California professor.5 5 The documents detailed years of mass-conspiracies
by cigarette companies to secure their market positions at the expense of
their very own customers and society in general. 6 Thus, the Cigarette
Papers helped shift the balance from a "David v. Goliath ' 57 relationship to a
more level playing field by providing something of a smoking gun against
cigarette manufacturers.5 8  Success followed the unearthing of these
documents with twenty-two plaintiffs settling their suits with cigarette giant
Liggett & Myers Corporation (Liggett).59 However, more importantly,
Liggett admitted publicly that cigarettes cause dozens of potentially fatal
diseases and that tobacco companies purposefully target children.6 The
Liggett settlement also spawned the discovery of 250,000 pages of
documents implicating the tobacco industry in conspiracy cover-ups for
decades,'and which have been used in later litigation.
6 1
The first jury award came in the landmark case of Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter where a jury for the first time awarded
$750,000 in damages to the plaintiffs using incriminating information that
came from the infamous Cigarette Papers.62 Unfortunately, the damage
award was overturned by the Florida District Court of Appeal on statute of
limitations grounds.6 3 The Florida Supreme Court later overturned the
appellate holding.64
53 Kearns, supra note 52, at 1341; Strain, supra note 4, at 859.
54 Kearns, supra note 52, at 1342.
55 Barr, supra note 20, at 798.
56 Id.
57 Howard M. Erichson, Toxic Torts: Issues of Mass Litigation, Case Management and
Ethics Articles, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL. REv. 123, 124 (2001).
58 Barr, supra note 20, at 797.
'9 Id. at 797-798.
60 Id. at 798.
61 id
62 Id.; Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 95-934-CA CV-B (Fla. Duval
Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 1996); Strain, supra note 4, at 860.
63 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998). See also Barr, supra note 20, at 798 n.80.
64 Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2000).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 25:485 (2005)
The Cigarette Papers and increasing public skepticism of tobacco
companies helped refute the long standing "assumption of risk" defense
used by cigarette companies for decades in the "first and second waves ' 65
of tobacco litigation; smoking was no longer considered voluntary, but a
result of Big Tobacco's attempts to addict smokers.66  The new theo 77
advanced by plaintiffs was referred to as the "addiction as injury" claim.
Thousands of new litigants came to the forefront armed with this new
theory.68
C. The Class Action Lawsuit and Tobacco Litigation
Although class action lawsuits would seem to be the most logical and
efficient way to adjudicate tobacco claims, because of the ability of class
actions to bring together litigants with otherwise limited resources, both
state and federal courts have been extremely reluctant to certify classes for
mass tort claims regarding tobacco litigation.6 9 The main reason behind the
reluctance of courts to allow classes of millions to bring suit stems from the
fact that individualized injuries would make grouping plaintiffs as a class
impractical and almost impossible.
70
Class actions are governed on the federal level by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23).71 The four main requirements for a class
action lawsuit are: 1) numerosity; 2) commonality; 3) typicality; and 4)
adequacy of representation. 72 The problem with class actions in general,
and tobacco class actions in particular, is that the requirements of Rule 23
65 See generally, Barr, supra note 20.
66 Kearns, supra note 52, at 1342.
67 Id.
68 id.
69 Melodie C. Hahn, Smokers Chances of a Fair Fight Against the Tobacco Companies
Go Up in Smoke: A Study of Phillip Morris v. Angeletti and Its Effect on the Viability of
Class Action Lawsuits in Maryland Tobacco Litigation, 31 U. BALT. L. REv. 103, 103
(2001).
70 Id.
71 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (2004).
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2004).
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are not met because of the "typicality" requirement. 73 Tobacco companies
often argue that the causation link between cigarettes and cancer or the
extent of the individual plaintiffs' addiction varies within a class and thus, it
cannot be said that any one injury is "typical" to the entire class.74
Class actions have the potential to eliminate two of the greatest
problems facing individual plaintiffs in the fight against big tobacco;
namely the aforementioned lack of resources and the lack of strategic
coordination.75 Class action lawsuits allow plaintiffs to combine both
resources and strategies, thereby plaintiffs are better equipped to face
powerful tobacco companies in court.76 Thus, using the example of
Castano, instead of smokers suing independently, that case was filed on
behalf of over one hundred million Americans who were addicted to
cigarettes.77
Another problem for plaintiffs in huge class action lawsuits (as was the
case in Castano) is the court's unwillingness to overlook the role that juries
play in damage awards.78 The Fifth Circuit Court decertified the class of
plaintiffs in Castano, and held that "the collective wisdom of individual
juries is necessary before [this court] commits the fate of an entire industry
or, indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to a single jury."'79 Facing
decertification in federal court, plaintiffs often turn to state courts to plead
their claims. 80
Another problem which arises with the class action lawsuit is that it
may be speculative. 81 As demonstrated in Castano, "addiction as injury"
over a class of a million people diminishes, rather than strengthens, an
individual claimant's ability to bring a more personal and probably more
successful case against a cigarette manufacturer.82
Thus, although originally thought to be a more natural forum for
tobacco litigation because of multi-jurisdictional issues, federal courts were
considered to be a poor forum for plaintiffs after Castano.83 Some
commentators believe this is unfortunate and argue that federal courts
should remain a suitable alternative to state courts as forums for massive
73 Kearns, supra note 52, at 1360.
74 id.
75 Erichson, supra note 57, at 131.
76 Barr, supra note 20, at 799.
77 Id. See also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)
78 Barr, supra note 20, at 799; Castano, 84 F.3d at 746
79 Id. at 804 (quoting Castano, 84 F.3d 734 at 751-52).
80 Erichson, supra note 57, at 138.
81 Kearns, supra note 52, at 1346-47.
82 Id. at 1347.
83 Erichson, supra note 58, at 137-38.
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class action lawsuits.84 Federal courts could play a valuable part in
protecting against substantive due process violations in state courts.
8
D. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds - Victory at Last?
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. is the biggest victory by plaintiffs
yet in the war against tobacco. 86 In Engle, 500,000 Florida residents were
awarded $144.8 billion in punitive damages-the largest award in U. S.
history against tobacco companies. 87 The plaintiffs' primary claim was that
the cigarette company manipulated the amount of tobacco in their cigarettes
and concealed the addictive nature of their product.88 The class sought
$200 billion in damages for the cigarette companies' concealment of the
addictive nature of nicotine. 89 Surprisingly, the district court judge certified
the class, and this decision was immediately appealed by the tobacco
industry. 90 Engle seemed to be the high point for plaintiffs in their fight
against cigarette manufacturers.
Nonetheless, there were controversial aspects about the Engle case.
First, the jury was told to assess punitive damages in one lump sum, rather
than the usual practice of assessing damages individually.9  Only then
would compensatory damages be assessed for individual plaintiffs.92
In the end, the $145 billion award was overturned by Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal, ordering the class of plaintiffs decertified and
holding that they must sue tobacco companies individually if they wish to
continue with their claim. 93 When the claim was initially brought, the class
84 Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from the Tobacco
Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL. REV. 93,
120-21 (2001).
85 Id. at 94-95. However, recent Supreme Court decisions have nonetheless made federal
courts very unattractive for settling tobacco-style massive class-action disputes. See id. at
95-98 (citing Anchem Products, Inc v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) and Oritz v.
Fiberboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)).
86 Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 at * 13
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000); Barr, supra note 20, at 788.
87 Barr, supra note 20, at 788; Engle, 2000 WL 33534572 at * 13.
88 Barr, supra note 20 at 806; Engle, 2000 WL 33534572 at "13.
89 Barr, supra note 20 at 806; Engle, 2000 WL 33534572 at *20.
90 Id. The case was appealed by the tobacco companies and eventually District Court of
Appeal of Florida, Third District decertified the class. See Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853
So. 2d 434, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
91 Barr, supra note 20 at 806.
92 Id.
93 Eric Tischler, Tobacco Class Action Goes Up in Smoke: Individual and Government
Cases Proceed, 39 TRiAL 12, 12 (Aug. 2003); Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 853 So. 2d 434
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 21, 2003).
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was reduced from American smokers to Florida smokers.9 4 Despite this
reduction, the court the class was too big, and that the many diverse injuries
and different situations made individual suits much more practical,
especially in terms of applying proper state law.95 Also, because punitive
damages were assessed as a lump sum prior to the assessment of
compensatory damages to each plaintiff within the class, the District Court
struck down the punitive damage award as "premature. 96 Thus, it remains
to be seen what direction Engle will take; regardless, Engle is likely to
become a landmark case. It shows that plaintiffs have come a long way in
their war against tobacco, and that juries have become extremely
sympathetic-a factor which did not exist twenty years ago.
III. THE HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
The battle against big tobacco has experienced minor success, at best,
outside of the United States. Following the American model, suits against
cigarette companies have been filed in England, Scotland, Ireland, Finland,
France, Japan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Norway.97 This
comment will focus on tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom, and
contrast it to cases brought in the United States. The United Kingdom
provides a good point of comparison because tobacco litigation is relatively
young and the legal system is sufficiently different (e.g. class actions are
seldom brought). Such a comparison allows for a thorough inquiry into
why plaintiffs in nations other than the United States have not been
successful in their cases against big tobacco.
European Community nations have generally followed a path similar
to that of the United States in tobacco litigation. 98 The Council of the
European Economic Community (EEC) adopted the Tobacco Labeling
Directive on November 13, 1989. 99 The Tobacco Labeling Directive sets
forward a list of warnings the individual governments may choose to
implement into their national legislation.100
94 Liggett, 853 So. 2d. 434; Tischler, supra note 93.
95 Liggett, 853 So. 2d. at 443-43; Tischler, supra note 93, at 12-13.
96 Liggett 853 So. 2d 434; Tischler, supra note 93, at 13-14.
97 RICHARD A. DAYNARD, CLIVE BATES & NElL FRANCEY, Tobacco Litigation Worldvide,
320 BMJ 111, 112-13 (Jan. 8, 2000), available at http://bmj.bmjjoumals.com/cgi/reprint/
320/7227/ 11 .pdf.
98 Cooper, supra note 8, at 300.
99 Id. at 275-76; Council Directive of 13 November 1989 on the Approximation of the
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning the
Labeling of Tobacco Products (Tobacco Labeling Directive), 1989 O.J. (L 359) 1
[hereinafter Tobacco Labeling Directive].100 Cooper, supra note 8, at 276; Tobacco Labeling Directive, supra note 99.
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Just recently, the European Union was fairly close to implementing an
outright ban on tobacco advertising.'0 ' The "Television without Frontiers"
Directive would have prohibited tobacco companies from sponsoring
television programs. 10 2 This Directive, which intended to ban all direct and
indirect advertising was enacted by the European Community in July of
1998 and should have been implemented by member states by July 20,
2001.103 It looked like Europe was to take a giant step in the fight against
tobacco. In December of 2002, the European Union voted to outlaw
tobacco advertising in newspapers, magazines, on the Internet and at
sporting events. °4 The restrictions were approved by thirteen out of fifteen
E.U. health ministers. Germany was the main opponent, arguing that the
restrictions go too far when applied to print media sold outside of the
country. 0 5  In 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that earlier
attempts to restrict tobacco gave the European Union too much control over
tobacco advertising, an area that should be reserved for control by E.U.
member states.
106
A. "So Close Yet So Far"-The Leigh Day Case
Until October 2003, no tobacco case had made it past the discovery
stage in the United Kingdom. In fact, a few cases that experienced success
have died after years of tiresome discovery. Such an example is the Leigh
Day case, named for the law firm representing the plaintiffs, and the first
class action lawsuit against a tobacco company. After six years of pretrial
preparation, the case never reached trial because forty-six of the fifty-two
class-action plaintiffs simply gave up on the extended litigation. °7
Litigants were discouraged into abandoning their claims against the tobacco
company when the High Court found major faults regarding statue of
limitation issues and problems relating to what he believed were
"speculative" negligence claims.108
101 Melissa Alegre, We've Come a Long Way Baby (or Have We?): Banning Tobacco
Advertising and Sponsorship in the European Union, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157,
159 (2003).
102 Id.; "Television without Frontiers" directive 89/552/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L298); Council
Directive 98/43/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9, 10-11.
103 Id.
104 BBC News, EU Adopts Tobacco Ad Ban (Dec. 2, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2535071 .stm.
105 Id.
106 Id.; Case C-376/98, F.R.G. v. Eur. Parliament & Council of the E.U., [2000] E.C.R. I-
8419 (2000).
107 Ernest Beck, UK Tobacco Lawsuit's Collapse May Send Litigation up in Smoke, THE
WALL ST. J. Interactive Edition, Mar. 1, 1999, available at http://lists.essential.org/
intl-tobacco/msgOO06O.html.
108 id.
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The case officially ended on February 26, 1999, after a ruling that
thirty-six of the plaintiffs suffering from lung cancer could not continue
their case against U.K. tobacco giants Gallaher and Imperial Tobacco
(Gallaher, Imperial) because they, had been diagnosed with the disease more
than three years prior to suing.'0
The statute of limitations proved key to the case and eventually led to
its collapse. The actions began in 1992, and a series of hearings followed
on the eligibility of members of the class who had sued more than three
years after they were diagnosed with cancer.1 1 0
The Limitations Act (1980) states that plaintiffs must bring actions
within three years of being diagnosed with cancer.11 ' Thirty-six of the fifty-
two plaintiffs had started their actions more than three years after they had
been diagnosed with cancer; this weakened the plaintiffs' case from the
outset.12 Nevertheless, § 33 of the Act does permit the judge hearing the
case to exercise discretion in allowing cases to proceed where the statute of
limitations has tolled if it would be in the "interest of justice."' 13
Though trial was set for January 2000, the case was dropped when
High Court Judge Michael Wright ruled that the court could not allow
plaintiffs' claim to proceed under § 33.114 Nevertheless, some
commentators have suggested that the judge refused to exercise his
discretion because the plaintiffs' case was weak from the beginning. 15 The
judge thought that the plaintiffs' claim that Gallaher was negligent in
reducing levels of tar in its cigarettes was too "speculative" to bypass the
statute of limitations problems. 16 Although not an ultimate victory for
tobacco litigants, the Leigh Day case paved the way and provided
momentum for plaintiffs in the United Kingdom.
B. The First U.K. Case to Reach Trial - McTear v. Imperial Tobacco
The first tobacco case ever to reach trial in the United Kingdom started
trial in early October of 2003.117 Scotland's Court of Session held a bench
109 Action on Smoking and Health, The Law Courts: UK Tobacco Litigation at
http://www.ash.org.uk/htmllitigation/uktobal.html (last visited on Dec. 5, 2004); Hodgson v.
Imperial Tobacco Ltd., [1999] C.L.Y. 459 (Q.B.D.).
110 Action on Smoking & Health, supra note 109.
11 Limitation Act, 1980, c. 58, pt. I, § 11 (Eng.).
112 Action on Smoking & Health, supra note 109.
113 Id; Limitation Act, supra note 111.
114 Beck, supra note 107.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Cigarette Giant Denies Smoking Leads to Cancer, THE LONDON OBSERVER, Oct. 6,
2003, at 7, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/06/
2003070628.
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trial, which lasted much longer than the expected twenty weeks." 8 Some
say the trial lasted so long because of "bully tactics" used by Imperial, who
refused to accept the link between smoking and lung cancer, forcing Mrs.
McTear's lawyers to prove what has been accepted by doctors for over
fifty years."l 9
Margaret McTear sued on behalf of her husband, Alf, who smoked two
packs of cigarettes a day since 1964, when he was twenty years old.120 Alf
McTear was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1992, just three months before
his death.' 2' He filed the case against Imperial shortly before his death.
122
Mrs. McTear faced a difficult battle to continue the case. Among other
scare tactics, Imperial requested up to £2 million to cover the costs of
litigation-a move rejected by the judge. 123 McTear would have had no
choice but to drop the case if Imperial had forced her to cover the costs of
the trial. 1
24
There is much hesitation from the tobacco industry because it fears
that a win for McTear would lead to a chain of litigation by smokers and
their families similar to that occurring in the United States. 125 Imperial
refused to accept that cigarettes can cause cancer and it used all its strength
to fight Mrs. McTear; there are more than twenty cases pending in
Scotland, which will be allowed to proceed if Mrs. McTear's case is
successful. 1
26
Nevertheless, McTear faces a challenge similar to the plaintiffs in the
Leigh Day case, as McTear's pleas for Legal Aid have twice failed due to
the case's poor chances for success. 27 McTear is determined and has asked
for £500,000 in damages. She hopes that the case will serve as an example
and pave the path for future plaintiffs. 2 8 Mrs. McTear has always said that
the money is not as important to her as having Imperial accept the fact that
118 Id.
119 Press Release, Action on Smoking and Health (Scotland), Imperial Tobacco's
Behaviour Despicable Says ASH, (Nov. 11, 2003), at http://www.ash.org.uk/html/press/
031111 .html.





125 David Jones, Smokers Case Against UK Tobacco Firm Goes to Trial, FoRBES, Oct. 3,
2003, available at http://www.forbes.com/business/energy/newswire/2003/l0/03/
rtr1099170.html.
126 Action on Smoking and Health (Scotland), Products Liability - Scottish Legal Case,
at http://www.ashscotland.org.uk/issues/tobintro.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
127 Id. For a discussion on Legal Aid, see infra Part IV.A.
128 Id.
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cigarettes cause cancer and that it should protect future generations.
1 29
A decision was expected in April of 2004,- but as of January 2005, it
had not been released by the High Court. Regardless of the outcome, the
McTear case will be crucial for the future of tobacco litigation in the United
Kingdom-either by chilling future cases, or opening the floodgates for
litigants.
IV. WHY THE AMERICAN MODEL OF FIGHTING THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY IS NOT ADAPTABLE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
The simple truth is that the U.S. and U.K. legal systems are inherently
different. Below I point out several reasons why the two systems are
different, and argue that the inherent difference between the legal systems
of the United States and the United Kingdom has caused different results in
tobacco litigation.
A. Class Action Lawsuits in the United Kingdom
Unlike the United States where there is a tradition supporting class
actions as a way of impacting social policy, in other countries, including the
United Kingdom, the tradition does not exist. 130 Most nations outside of the
United States have determined that "tort litigation is not an effective or
efficient method to achieve social or personal justice, 1 3 1 and therefore, rely
on government regulation to dictate public policy. 132  The idea of an
attorney general who "represents" the public interest is a good example of
the fundamental difference between the role of private parties and the
judicial system, and helps to explain why there are great obstacles to
bringing class actions in Europe, including the United Kingdom.
33
Because of the strong reliance on government intervention in the private
marketplace, there is very little "incentive" to use class actions to shape
public policy. 34  There is no evidence that in nations with strong
governmental regulation schemes in place, regulation through
compensation would serve as an effective tool in shaping policy.
35
Whereas class actions in the United States are governed by Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United Kingdom does not have a
129 Jones, supra note 125.
130 Richard 0. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of Class
Actions in International Dispute, 10 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 205, 207 (2001).
... Id. at 208-09.
132 Id. at 207.
133 Id. at 208.
134 Id.
135 Faulk, supra note 130, at 208.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 25:485 (2005)
similar structure governing multi-party litigation. 136 The United Kingdom
does, however, have a means of organizing a class, referred to as the "lead
case" method. 137  Here, a lead plaintiff is chosen from a group of
prospective plaintiffs, and usually is the individual with the strongest
case. 38 Sometimes a plaintiff who has been given legal aid is chosen so
that the government will end up financing the claim through Legal Aid.3 9
This approach has been criticized because it is impossible for the lead
claimant's case to solve all the issues of the entire class. 140 Further, the rest
of the class is required to wait pending the results of the lead case, a process
which is considered unnecessarily time consuming. 141
As a side note, the Legal Aid Scheme was established in 1949 in order
to advance the British government's aim of "assist[ing] people who cannot
afford to pay the cost of resolving disputes about their rights in practical
ways.' 142 To obtain legal aid, applicants must prove that they are eligible
for legal aid by showing "reasonable grounds for bringing, defending, or
participating in the suit."' 4 3 The McTear case demonstrates the difficulties
in funding a tobacco suit with legal aid. 144 Mrs. McTear's request for legal
aid was rejected by the Legal Aid Board because of concerns regarding
spending public money in a long, drawn-out case which had "limited
prospects of a worthwhile return" due to issues relating to Mr. McTear's
contributory negligence. 145  The law firm of Ross Harper & Murphy
subsequently took the McTear case on a 'no-win, no-fee' basis. 14 6 Legal
Aid's reluctance to gamble on plaintiffs who have small chances of winning
their claims because of contributory negligence issues exacerbates the
problem and makes class actions even more difficult to bring when
plaintiffs lack funds. 1
47
B. Loser Pays Attorneys' Fees
In addition to the idea that litigation is not accepted as a suitable means
136 Kristen Garman Rogers, Mad Plaintiff Disease?: Tobacco Litigation and the British
Debate over Adoption ofU.S-Style Tort Litigation Methods, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 199,
221 (1998).
' Id. at 222-23.
138 Id. at 223.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Rogers, supra note 136, at 223.
142 Id.
143 id.
144 Id. at 225.
145 Id.
146 Action on Smoking and Health (Scotland), supra note 126.
147 Rogers, supra note 136, at 226.
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of shaping public policy, the majority of the international community forces
litigants to take a greater level of responsibility-and risk-in having the
court system resolve personal disputes. 148 Thus, the loser often pays a
substantial, if not the entire, amount of their opponent's legal expenses,
which discourages frivolous suits that have no merit. 149 This rule, applied
to tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom, ensures that injured parties are
compensated more often by non-judicial means than by law suits. 50 In
other words, it makes it less attractive for individuals to resort to the courts
to adjudicate their claims. Thus, greater responsibility is given to the
legislature to look out for its citizens, as the legislature is more accountable
to the public than are the courts.
15 1
Having to pay for one's opponent's legal costs removes much
incentive to litigate if not almost certain of victory; this disincentive is even
greater in the extremely expensive class-action context. 152 This point is of
crucial importance in tobacco cases where the discrepancy in resources
between the defendant tobacco companies and the litigants is so great.
153
C. Punitive Damages Are Not Popular in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, punitive damages are awarded only (1) "where
there has been oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct by servants
of the government," and (2) "where the defendant's conduct was calculated
to make a profit for them which might well exceed the compensation
payable to the plaintiff as damages."' 5  This definition arose in the 1964
case of Rookes v. Barnard which dealt with defamation. 155 Prior to 1964,
there was also a third category similar to justifications of punitive damages
in the United States, which was rejected in Rookes v. Barnard: "where
defendant acted willfully, wantonly, oppressively and in conscious
disregard for the plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff could recover" aggravated
damages.156 English courts have specifically rejected extending punitive
(aggravated) damages to situations beyond the two expressed in Rookes. 157
The court refused to award punitive damages in AB v. South West Water
Services Ltd., where plaintiffs who suffered sickness from drinking




152 Rogers, supra note 136, at 228.
151 Id. at 203.
154 Rookes v. Barnard, 1 All E.R. 367 (1964); see also Rogers, supra note 136, at 218.
115 Rookes, 1 All. E.R. 367.
156 Cassell & Co. v. Broome, 1 All E.R. 801 (1972); see also Rogers, supra note 136, at
218.
157 Rogers, supra note 136, at 218-19.
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contaminated water provided by defendant water service company, charged
that defendants withheld information from health authorities and customers
to minimize the consumption of the infected water and did not provide an
alternative water source. 1 58 This situation, which is extremely similar to
what tobacco plaintiffs often claim, fell on deaf ears with the AB judge who
referred to Casell and read Rookes extremely narrowly to hold that
negligence, even when "coupled with deceit," is not the type of action for
which exemplary (punitive) damages are to be awarded. 59  Thus, the
British courts have eliminated a crucial element that has worked to "bring
tobacco companies to the bargaining table"'160 in the United States. If the
United Kingdom really is serious about following the United States' lead in
holding tobacco companies responsible for the ill effects of smoking,
limiting the situations in which punitive damages are awarded so narrowly
takes it a huge leap backwards in its fight against big tobacco.
D. Conditional Attorney's Fees
Conditional attorney's fees were introduced in the United Kingdom in
1995.161 The system was in place in Scotland prior to 1995 and applies to
England and Wales except in family law and criminal law.' 62 Conditional
fees allow British attorneys to enter "no fee, no win" agreements-if the
client loses, no fee is awarded, and if the client is successful, the fee is
charged.63 However, U.K. attorneys "may not contract for a percentage of
damage awards as compensation for their work." 64 Nevertheless, very few
tobacco litigants opt for contingency fee agreements (the McTear case is a
rare exception) because most tobacco litigants are dissuaded by the "loser
pays" rule.' 65 Contingency fees are working out much better than skeptics
assumed when they were first introduced, as law firms are accurate in
assessing risks, and lawyers usually do not simply take on projects to make
money but rather to affect social change. 166 Taking cases on contingency in
an effort to effect change through litigation rather than legislation is
considered an "Americanization" of the U.K. legal system. 16  Thus,
because of changes in the way the United Kingdom views the courts and
158 AB v. S.W. Water Servs. Ltd., 1 All E.R. 609 (1993).
159 Rogers, supra note 136, at 219.
161 Id. at 218.
161 Geraint Howells, Tobacco Litigation in the U.S. - Its Impact on the United Kingdom,
22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 693, 696 (1998).
162 Faulk, supra note 130, at 227.
163 Id.
164 id.
165 Rogers, supra note 136, at 229. See supra Part IV.B.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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litigation against tobacco companies (e.g. the introduction of contingency
fees), it is likely only a matter of time before verdicts similar to those
handed down in U.S. courts are handed down in the United Kingdom.
E. The Issue of Personal Responsibility
Some commentators have argued that the reason why the cases against
the tobacco industry do not even get to court is because European society
places more importance on the idea of "personal responsibility" for one's
actions than in the United States.' 68 Smoking is viewed in Europe and the
United Kingdom as a matter of personal choice. 169  European society
believes that individuals should take responsibility for their actions. This
might be yet another reason why tobacco claims against cigarette
companies have not been very successful in the United Kingdom.
In Europe, a third of the adult population smokes cigarettes despite the
fact that close to 500,000people die from smoking related diseases per year
in the European Union. 17  The bottom line is that people are still dying
regardless of whose responsibility it is, be it in Europe or the United States.
In order to counter the belief that individuals who smoke should not have
the right to sue cigarette companies for their personal choices, British
tobacco plaintiffs can argue "addiction as injury."'172 This theory argues
that it is not really an issue of personal responsibility because the tobacco
companies caused the plaintiffs addiction by increasing nicotine levels and
thus, they no longer had control over their smoking habits.' 73 Although it is
true that cigarette companies did not force anybody to begin smoking,
"addiction as injury" still remains the best weapon against the defense that
smoking and its subsequent health problems is an issue of personal
responsibility, and not an issue in which the courts should get involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco litigation plaintiffs have been much more successful in the
United States than in the United Kingdom. First, plain and simple, the
United States has gotten a head start. Whereas warnings on cigarette packs
became mandatory in the United States in 1964, they were not required in
the United Kingdom until 1971 .'7 Additionally, the U.K. courts have
refused to hear any case against the tobacco industry until October of
168 Beck, supra note 107.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Alegre, supra note 101, at 158.
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2003.175 Some commentators have argued that cases against the tobacco
industry do not even get to court is because European society places more
importance on the idea of "personal responsibility" for one's actions. 1
76
Next, tobacco litigation has not been successful for U.K. plaintiffs
because the system in the United Kingdom is fundamentally different than
in the United States. First, most cases are heard before a judge, as opposed
to a jury, who is often much less sympathetic to the plaintiff. 177 Further, the
United Kingdom does not use the courts as a method of shaping public
policy the way the United States does. 7 8 The United Kingdom uses
legislative means to dictate its public policy and thus is hesitant to punish
private parties in order to send a message out to the public. 179 Of course,
this policy explains the United Kingdom's hesitancy in awarding punitive
damages. In the United Kingdom, punitive damages are awarded in the
narrowest of circumstances and it does not look like tobacco plaintiffs
would qualify for an award for punitive damages under recent U.K.
common law.'8° In addition, although having a conditional fee system set
up where the plaintiff does not have to pay his attorney's fees unless he
wins might seem to encourage plaintiffs to bring tobacco suits in court, the
fact that U.K. law requires the loser in a litigation to pay for the attorneys'
fees of the victor works to intimidate many small plaintiffs into not taking
their claims to court m81 Although the theory behind having the loser pay
attorneys' fees works to discourage frivolous lawsuits that unnecessarily tie
up the courts, plaintiffs like Mrs. McTear are at risk of losing their homes
182
in their quest to seek justice from big tobacco.
Finally, relying on class actions is problematic, even in the United
States, which has a longer history of tobacco litigation than the United
Kingdom. Often, the problem of application of state law or the law of
similar claims by members of the extremely large classes leads courts to
disallow the certification of the class because they believe that suits are
better handled individually. 183 In the United Kingdom, where group actions
are not all that popular in the first place, certification of classes and judicial
and public acceptance of class actions as a method of bringing justice often
does not bring any result. As can be seen in the Leigh Day case, after years
of discovery the judge hearing the case decided that the class of fifty-two
175 See Jones, supra note 125.
176 Beck, supra note 107.
177 Id.
178 Faulk, supra note 130, at 209.
179 id.
180 Id.
181 Rogers, supra note 136, at 229.
182 Jones, supra note 125.
183 See generally Tischler, supra note 93.
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plaintiffs did not have much of a case because their claims were too
attenuated. 
84
Despite all of the problems facing tobacco litigation in the United
Kingdom, the fact that the McTear case finally got past discovery and
reached the courtroom shows that there is hope for such litigation in the
future. Although the McTear case has been criticized by commentators as
being weak for the plaintiffs, it is definitely a step in the right direction and,
if successful, might open the door for similar claims against the tobacco
industry in the United Kingdom. The court's decision in McTear will be
crucial to the future of tobacco litigation in the United Kingdom.
184 Beck, supra note 107.
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